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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court recently dipped its toe into long-
standing debates about judicial takings in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection,1 the intimation that the Court might finally recognize the 
doctrine generated a wave of responses.2 Commentators concerned 
with the expansion of regulatory takings jurisprudence argued that it 
would be unwise to apply the Takings Clause to the judiciary;3 those 
inclined to defend a more vigorous application of the Clause, perhaps 
not surprisingly, saw a promising new avenue of vindication.4 
 
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. 
 1. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 2. Judicial takings involve the proposition that not only legislative and executive action 
might violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, but a decision interpreting a state’s 
common law of property might also be violative when it functions as the equivalent of an 
affirmative exercise of eminent domain. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial 
Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990). The closest the Court had gotten to recognizing that a 
judicial decision might constitute a taking of private property was Justice Stewart’s concurrence 
in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296–98 (1967). See also Stevens v. City of Cannon 
Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 3. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary Is 
Different, 35 VT. L. REV. 475, 475–76 (2010) (arguing that the Takings Clause should not extend 
to the judicial branch); Barton Thompson, Judicial Takings Redux: Stop the Beach 
Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection 4 (Nov. 5, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.boalt.org/elq/documents/takingsconference_Thomson_20 
10_1025.pdf (“Those justices (and members of the academy and bar) already skeptical of 
expansive takings protections are unlikely to advocate for their extension to courts, further 
constraining the ability of the state to adapt property law to changing knowledge, conditions, 
and norms.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 3, at 6 (arguing that Stop the Beach Renourishment and 
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In recent years, whenever the Court has commented on aspects of 
takings jurisprudence, a perennial tension has resurfaced between 
concerns about limitations on the government’s flexibility to adjust 
property rights over time and the recognition of limits on that 
perceived interference with individual property rights. Thus, 
arguments about this balance have reemerged following decisions 
about the standard for public use,5 the role of notice in regulatory 
takings,6 the limits on land-use conditions and exactions,7 and others. 
The question whether a judicial act can violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s incorporation of the Fifth Amendment may seem an 
unremarkable new ground for this running debate, with the real 
conceptual challenge lying in the relevant substantive standard for 
determining when a judicial act, to borrow Justice Holmes’s 
memorably cryptic phrase, “goes too far.”8 
The threshold proposition that a judicial decision elucidating the 
contours of common-law property rights is state action under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, however, puts Stop the Beach 
Renourishment in a different category than many of the Court’s 
recent forays into takings. Constitutional property cases often present 
starkly different conceptions of the role of the state in private 
property. On the one hand, private property is understood as 
relatively fixed according to long-standing common-law doctrine that 
reflects almost pre-political norms of ownership and exclusion—a 
view to which Justice Scalia seems to subscribe. On the other hand, 
 
judicial takings “can serve as useful reminders to state courts of the importance of property 
precedents”); D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 
903, 904 (2011) (exploring how courts can implement judicial takings doctrine). 
 5. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005). 
 6. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001). 
 7. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374, 377 (1994). 
 8. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice Scalia, in the Stop the Beach 
Renourishment plurality, brushed aside this challenge, asserting simply that a decision that 
“declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists” 
constitutes a taking. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2596 (2010). What standard will guide that determination—in other words, what 
constitutes “established” rights and what kinds of decisions should be understood to eliminate 
such rights—is only hinted at in a footnote in which Justice Scalia makes clear that any such 
determination that there has been a change in state law should be made without deference to 
the very state judges responsible for defining that law. Id. at 2608 n.9. For an argument for 
applying a natural law standard for determining when a state common-law decision transgresses 
the Takings Clause, see Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights under the Takings Doctrine: The 
Clash Between the Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 37 (2011). 
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some Justices seem to embrace a more legal realist approach that 
recognizes the interrelation between the contingency of property 
rights and the inherent centrality of the state in defining and 
moderating this aspect of private ordering.9 
In many ways, a high-water mark for the realist conception of 
property came in the famous 1948 decision Shelley v. Kraemer,10 a case 
that involved judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants. 
After finding that the covenants would be legally unobjectionable if 
left entirely in the realm of “voluntary adherence,”11 the Court held 
that the act of judicial enforcement brought the covenants into the 
realm of state action, and thus amenable to review under the Equal 
Protection Clause.12 The Court has never fully embraced the 
implications of this view of the state role in defining private property 
and in fact rarely recognizes state action in other circumstances that 
might logically dictate a straightforward application of Shelley.13 As a 
result, Shelley has largely been limited to its own context and the 
Court has resisted expanding the realm of decisions involving private 
property that could be considered state action.14 
Few would lightly associate Justice Scalia and the other members 
of the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality with core realist 
understandings of property, but the framework the plurality deployed 
to find judicial opinions subject to review under the Takings Clause 
resonates strongly with the Court’s earlier approach to state action in 
Shelley. Justice Scalia’s argument in Stop the Beach Renourishment is 
grounded largely in text and what he saw as a conceptually 
problematic attempt to impose a state separation of powers doctrine 
as a matter of federal constitutional law.15 Simply put, Justice Scalia 
argued, if a legislative or executive act can be considered state action, 
then the same can be said of a judicial decision, thus opening the 
possibility of recognizing the state role in a much broader array of 
property disputes. 
 
 9. For a discussion of competing approaches, see Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 
91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1558–66 (2003). 
 10. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 11. Id. at 13. 
 12. Id. at 20. 
 13. See generally Developments in the Law, State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1261–64 (2010) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s turn toward 
neoformalism in state-action doctrine and scholarly critique of that turn). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2605 
(2010). 
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It would be naïve to argue that the plurality’s logic could—or 
necessarily should—revive Shelley’s implicit promise of weighing a 
broader array of individual rights in property disputes. Nevertheless, 
the felt necessity remains for finding guidance in constitutional rights 
in the oversight of private property regimes that implicate equality, 
due process, free speech, and other values.16 Accordingly, that some 
measure of blurring between public and private is a logical 
consequence of the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality may 
mean that a doctrine of judicial takings is worth defending for those 
concerned with Shelley’s legacy. 
II. THE SHORT HALF-LIFE OF SHELLEY V. KRAEMER 
Shelley v. Kraemer still stands as a landmark case, continuing to 
form a part of the basic property canon, but nonetheless seems like an 
odd outlier. The case arose in the era before the Fair Housing Act and 
other statutes generally barred private discrimination in real 
property.17 Shelley consolidated two similar cases, each involving an 
attempt by an African-American family to purchase a home in 
violation of a racially restrictive covenant.18 In each case, neighbors 
sued to void the relevant sales, and in each case, the lower courts 
ultimately agreed to enforce the covenants and bar the owners from 
occupying the property they had purchased.19 
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether 
“judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements” violated the 
 
 16. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth Anniversary: “A Time for 
Keeping; A Time for Throwing Away”?, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 100 (1998) (“Examples abound 
of situations in which individuals seek constitutional protection against what are essentially 
private actions.”). 
 17. Congress passed Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A § 3601 et seq. 
(West 2010), at a time when the Court was also revising its understanding of the coverage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866. That Act, which textually barred private racial discrimination in 
property and related contractual relations, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981–1982 (West 2010), had been 
understood for more than a century to require state action. The Court in Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968), however, held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 applies to 
private discrimination. 
 18. The first of the two consolidated cases came out of St. Louis, Missouri; the other out of 
Detroit, Michigan. The covenant in the first case provided that for a period of fifty years, “no 
part of said property . . . shall be occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being 
intended hereby to restrict the use of said property for said period of time against the occupancy 
as owners or tenants of any portion of said property for resident or other purpose by people of 
the Negro or Mongolian Race.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4–5. Likewise, the second 
covenant provided that the relevant property “shall not be used or occupied by any person or 
persons except those of the Caucasian race.” Id. at 6. 
 19. Id. at 6–7. 
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.20 At the outset, 
the Court, with Chief Justice Vinson writing, distinguished the private 
covenants at issue from state action that mandated discrimination, as 
with ordinances that required segregation21 or that limited occupation 
on the basis of race.22 The Court made clear that, unlike an ordinance, 
racially restrictive covenants as such 
cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to 
petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the 
purposes of the agreement are effectuated by voluntary adherence 
to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action 
by the State, and the provisions of the Amendment have not been 
violated.23 
The Court, however, did not stop with that recognition of the 
distinction between direct state discrimination and the challenged 
private covenants. “[H]ere there was more,” the Court noted; in the 
cases at issue, “the purposes of the agreements were secured only by 
judicial enforcement by state courts.”24 The Court’s theory of state 
action flowed in clear terms, beginning with the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s text.25 Thus a state, the Court went on, “may act 
through different agencies, either by its legislative, its executive, or its 
judicial authorities, and the prohibitions of the amendment extend to 
all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws, whether it 
be action by one of these agencies or by another.”26 Likewise, state 
action under the Amendment includes judicial action and, the Court 
noted, “it has never been suggested that state court action is 
immunized from the operation of those provisions simply because the 
act is that of the judicial branch of state government.”27 Textually and 
structurally, the Court found, the Fourteenth Amendment draws no 
distinctions between various state actors.28 
 
 20. Id. at 7. Petitioners in the case also raised Due Process and Privileges and Immunities 
Clause challenges, but the Court resolved the case under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 23. 
 21. Id. at 11–13 (citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (striking down, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a municipal ordinance that prohibited “colored” persons from moving 
into majority-white blocks and white people from moving into majority-“colored” blocks) and 
Harmon v. Taylor, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (similar)). 
 22. Id. at 12 (citing City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930)). 
 23. Id. at 13. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 14. 
 26. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879)). 
 27. Id. at 18; see id. at 20 (“State action, as that phrase is understood for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms.”). 
 28. Id. at 20. 
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The Court concluded, “[w]e have no doubt that there has been 
state action in these cases in the full and complete sense of the 
phrase.”29 The enforcement of the restrictive covenants represented an 
instance in which “the States have made available to [private] 
individuals the full coercive power of government,” and, accordingly, 
“the power of the State to create and enforce property interests must 
be exercised within boundaries defined by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”30 
In terms of conceptions of property, it is hard to imagine a clearer 
illustration than Shelley of the realist insight that property is an 
inherently three-part relationship between the entitlement holder, the 
state, and everyone else. As Felix Cohen famously put it, property can 
be thought of metaphorically as an object with a label that reads: 
To the world: 
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may 
grant or withhold. 
Signed: Private citizen 
Endorsed: The state.31 
When the discriminating neighbors in Shelley called the 
endorsement for all it was worth, they were asserting their purported 
right to say to African-American purchasers “keep off,” and the lower 
courts obliged. The Supreme Court in turn made pellucid the 
necessity for the state to be involved in order for the private citizen’s 
rights to have meaning.32 
In the history of antidiscrimination jurisprudence, Shelley 
represents at once a landmark achievement and a reminder of paths 
glimpsed and then abandoned by the Court.33 There are many reasons 
 
 29. Id. at 19. 
 30. Id. at 22. 
 31. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954). For 
a classic general realist discussion of the role of the state in the enforcement of private ordering, 
see ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW (1952). 
 32. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19 (“The difference between judicial enforcement and 
nonenforcement of the restrictive covenants is the difference to petitioners between being 
denied rights of property available to other members of the community and being accorded full 
enjoyment of those rights on an equal footing.”). 
 33. See Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 
473 (1962); see also Martin A. Schwartz & Erwin Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16 
TOURO L. REV. 775, 779–86 (2000) (surveying state-action cases involving racial discrimination 
and contrasting to non-race cases). 
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why Shelley proved limited as a conceptual framework for judicial 
oversight of private property arrangements that might infringe on 
individual rights. The most central, however, was likely the seemingly 
untenable implications of a doctrine that could have rendered all 
judicial enforcement of private ordering constitutionally suspect. As 
Professor Mark Rosen recently noted, Shelley “threatened to dissolve 
the distinction between state action, to which Fourteenth Amendment 
limitations apply, and private action, which falls outside the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”34 That possibility, however, is just as evident 
in Stop the Beach Renourishment.35 
III. REREADING SHELLEY AFTER STOP THE BEACH 
RENOURISHMENT 
It is not uncommon to see Shelley invoked to bolster the argument 
for judicial takings, including in the pleadings before the Court in Stop 
the Beach Renourishment.36 It is perhaps not surprising, but is striking 
nonetheless, how closely the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality’s 
reasoning seems to echo Shelley’s logic. 
Justice Scalia’s approach in Stop the Beach Renourishment was 
simple and blunt. He began, inevitably, with text. “The Takings 
Clause,” Justice Scalia noted, “unlike, for instance, the Ex Post Facto 
Clauses . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or 
branches. It is concerned simply with the act, not the government 
actor.”37 There is “no textual justification,” Justice Scalia continued, 
 
 34. Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 
CAL. L. REV. 451, 453 (2007). 
 35. The brief promise of Shelley’s approach to state action parallels a similar conceptual 
opening for finding a different balance between private property and public law values that 
began with Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that a privately held “company 
town” was subject to constitutional scrutiny), and essentially closed with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 
U.S. 507, 517 (1976) (applying the Marsh test to shopping malls would “‘wholly disregard[] the 
constitutional basis on which private ownership of property rests in this country’” (quoting 
Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Local Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 332 (1968) (Black, J., 
dissenting))). The theory in Marsh was that a private owner was essentially acting in a state role, 
but the result was quite similar to Shelley’s implication that under the right circumstances, the 
private right to exclude in state law must yield to federal constitutional rights of those against 
whom that right is asserted. 
 36. This tendency goes all the way back to Professor Thompson’s early seminal treatment, 
see Thompson, supra note 2, at 1456, and continued with amici before the Court in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, see Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Home Builders and 
Florida Association of Home Builders as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4–5, Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151). 
 37. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 
(2010) (“nor shall private property be taken . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Const. amend 
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“for saying that the existence or scope of a State’s power to 
expropriate private property without just compensation varies 
according to the branch of government effecting the expropriation.”38 
To Justice Scalia, this plain language reading of the Takings Clause 
has the force of common sense. “It would be absurd to allow a State 
to do by judicial decree,” he argued, “what the Takings Clause forbids 
it to do by legislative fiat.”39 In sum, Justice Scalia concluded, “the 
Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property without 
paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the 
taking.”40 To the argument made by Justice Kennedy in concurrence 
that the Takings Clause should not apply to courts because the 
judiciary is not designed to make policy choices and is not politically 
accountable, Justice Scalia responded that while these “reasons may 
have a lot to do with sound separation of powers principles that ought 
to govern a democratic society,” such political process rationales 
“have nothing whatever to do with the protection of individual rights . 
. . .”41 
Justice Scalia’s entire textual and structural argument for allowing 
judicial review of allegations that a state-court decision has “taken” 
property applies with equal force to any other individual right 
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in the relevant 
text, or in any constitutional structural principle, insulates courts from 
accountability when courts act in ways that contravene individual 
rights constraints on the state. In short, the Stop the Beach 
Renourishment plurality reaches the same conclusion that Chief 
Justice Vinson did in Shelley, and by almost the same path. 
There are ways, of course, to distinguish Shelley from Justice 
Scalia’s paradigmatic judicial taking. First, Shelley arose from the 
enforcement of private covenants, whereas Stop the Beach 
Renourishment involved the judicial definition of common-law 
property rights. Second, the fact that the challenged elimination of 
property rights in Stop the Beach Renourishment accrued to the 
benefit of the state, as opposed to a decision resolving a conflict 
 
V)). 
 38. Id. Justice Scalia focused on the text of the Fifth Amendment, but he noted earlier in 
the opinion that the Fifth Amendment applied in this case through its incorporation in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2597. 
 39. Id. at 2601. 
 40. Id. at 2602. 
 41. Id. at 2605. 
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between two private parties, might be significant.42 Third, there may 
be an argument that would distinguish the clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment at issue in each case. Each of these potential grounds, 
however, for distinguishing judicial takings from other constitutional 
property decisions with respect to the issue of state action seem 
unconvincing. 
On the first point, although the question of enforcement versus 
substantive definition might make some difference with respect to the 
ground for liability (under the Equal Protection Clause, the Takings 
Clause, or otherwise), it is difficult to see how the distinction could 
matter for whether there has been state action. Indeed, except for the 
rare instance of a court that issues advisory opinions, such as the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, a state court is almost always 
going to define the scope of property rights in the context of a dispute 
between litigants. 
The inevitability of state-court dispute resolution leads to the 
second potential distinction: that it might somehow make a difference 
that the potential beneficiary of the judicial decision is the state, 
rather than another private party. Some scholars, most notably 
Professor Joseph Sax, have drawn a distinction between proprietary 
and nonproprietary governmental actions in the regulatory takings 
context,43 suggesting the need for more searching oversight when the 
 
 42. In a post, Professor Lior Strahilevitz thoughtfully argued that the “best way to make 
sense of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment is that judicial 
takings arise only in those instances in which the government now owns property that was 
previously held by a private party.” Lior Strahilevitz, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Kelo, and 
the Future of Judicial Takings, U. CHI. L. SCH. FACULTY BLOG (June 17, 2010, 3:32 PM), 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2010/06/stop-the-beach-renourishment-kelo-and-thefutu 
re-of-judicial-takings.html#tp. Strahilevitz reached this conclusion through two pieces of 
evidence. First, he noted that Justice Scalia made clear in Stop the Beach Renourishment that 
the remedy for a finding of a judicial taking is invalidation; to this he added Justice Scalia’s 
apparent view from the dissent the Justice joined in Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 
(2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), that absent blight, the “public use” requirement of the 
Takings Clause bars private-to-private transfers. Strahilevitz, supra. This argument, however, 
may conflate limits on the affirmative exercise of the power of eminent domain that the Kelo 
dissenters would have imposed with the general question whether an exercise of the police 
power (or other state power) constitutes a taking. It may be that in a given instance, the private 
nature of the recipient would cause a regulatory regime to fail, if it were a taking, for lack of 
public use, but regulations that transfer valuable property rights for the benefit of private 
parties are commonplace. 
 43. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63 (1964) (“[W]hen 
economic loss is incurred as a result of government enhancement of its resource position in its 
enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required; it is that result which is to be 
characterized as a taking. But losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of government 
acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-compensable exercise of the 
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government seeks to benefit itself rather than resolve disputes 
between private parties. As interesting as it would be to see Justice 
Scalia endorse this distinction, the logic of the plurality cannot 
support that. While not always clear, the basic thrust of the plurality’s 
approach seems to suggest that in any situation in which it would 
violate the Takings Clause for a legislature to declare the property of 
private party A to be the property of private party B,44 the same act in 
a private suit would be a judicial taking. On Justice Scalia’s logic, it is 
not where the property right goes after it is taken, but rather the fact 
of the expropriation itself—the destruction of the established right—
that matters.45 
Indeed, nothing in Justice Scalia’s takings jurisprudence, or, for 
that matter, in the Court’s approach to regulatory takings writ large, 
suggests a distinction between invasions of property rights that 
benefit the state and those that benefit private parties. The force of 
Justice Scalia’s argument for recognizing judicial takings turns on the 
proposition that there are neither textual nor institutional reasons to 
distinguish courts as arms of the state for purposes of review. 
Nowhere do the traditional kinds of political process rationales for 
cabining state legislative and executive action (such as fiscal illusion 
and the risk of abuse of the minority) appear in the plurality’s 
rationale.46 And, more generally, regulatory takings cases regularly 
 
police power.”). 
 44. Private-to-private transfers of property by the state do occur, and the Court made clear 
in Kelo that the question whether such a transfer satisfies the Public Use Clause turns on 
whether there is a sufficient public purpose. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (“The disposition of this 
case . . . turns on the question whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’”); 
see also id. at 477 (“Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long 
been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of 
transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the 
other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to 
another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a 
railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example.”). 
 45. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2601 (2010) (noting that “though the classic taking is a transfer of property to the State or to 
another private party by eminent domain, the Takings Clause applies to other state actions that 
achieve the same thing” and “our doctrine of regulatory takings ‘aims to identify regulatory 
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking’” (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005))). It is true that in enumerating general principles that govern 
takings jurisprudence, Justice Scalia notes “we approach the situation before us” in the category 
of takings that involves “States . . . recharacteriz[ing] as public property what was previously 
private property.” Id. Nothing in the rest of the plurality opinion, however, suggests that the 
potential ground for takings liability—that recharacterization—is the only kind of judicial 
decision that might transgress the Takings Clause. 
 46. Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia criticized Justice Kennedy’s invocation of 
judicial restraint by arguing that the Court should not impose some kind of federal 
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involve private beneficiaries, as with the traditional private 
mill/flooding cases47 and the modern “permanent physical invasion” 
cases.48 
Finally, the logic of the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality 
provides no basis for drawing distinctions on the question of state 
action between the various provisions of the Bill of Rights 
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.49 Text and 
structural logic, shorn of context and purposive reading, have the 
virtue of clarity, but the very same arguments would seem to apply to 
any substantive provision incorporated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This all the more so, given that the relevant harm (in 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, a judicial decision alleged to have 
eliminated established property rights) is in no way relevant to the 
question whether state action embodied in a judicial decision might 
transgress individual rights. Had Justice Scalia relied on a purposive 
reading of the Takings Clause, somehow elevating and distinguishing 
the particular property rights at issue for purposes of the state-action 
analysis, this distinction might make sense. That, however, is not the 
approach he took in the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality.50 
State action remains as much a flashpoint when it comes to the 
definition and enforcement of private property rights as it is in the 
larger discourse on the public/private divide.51 As easy as it is to point 
out routine judicial enforcement of private arrangements that would 
likely transgress various constitutional provisions, the felt necessity to 
 
constitutional separation of powers limitation upon the states, Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
130 S. Ct. at 2605, suggesting that Justice Scalia’s analysis is predicated on institutional 
equivalence, not the risk of state aggrandizement. 
 47. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177–78 (1871) (finding 
a taking under a state eminent domain provision, where a company had been authorized to 
build a dam and flooded property as a result). 
 48. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (finding a per se 
taking in law that authorized the permanent physical occupation of an apartment building by 
wire owned by a cable television company). 
 49. One could argue that the text and concept of the “state” for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause (“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law”) somehow varies from the same text and concept a clause 
later, which does not itself reference the state (“nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws”). Given the interdependence of these clauses, it is hard to see a 
distinction on this point. 
 50. Chief Justice Vinson in Shelley was more explicitly animated by a purposive reading of 
the Equal Protection Clause. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (discussing the 
historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified and the purposes it was 
chiefly designed to achieve). 
 51. See Developments in the Law, supra note 13. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/16/2011  12:47:55 PM 
86 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 6:1 
invoke constitutional protection where the judiciary enforces 
seemingly private claims for property continues to surface.52 Thus, for 
example, in a number of common interest community cases, 
governance regimes that functionally resemble traditional local 
government actions generate calls for constitutional oversight.53 
Though such claims are rarely validated, people subject to judicial 
enforcement of covenants that limit free speech, due process, equal 
protection, and other fundamental values argue that such judicial 
enforcement should come within the ambit of state action.54 
The persistence of claims for the constitutionalization of property 
disputes highlights a dilemma for those inclined to see merit in a 
broader state-action doctrine. The Takings Clause tends to find 
relatively little support compared to other enumerated federal 
constitutional rights from scholars otherwise inclined toward a 
vigorous view of individual rights.55 This point is only worth 
mentioning to note that the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality 
highlights that Takings Clause exceptionalism works both ways. 
Structural constitutional rules developed to protect property rights—
the animating spirit of the plurality—can as easily apply to other 
individual rights. 
IV. PROPERTY’S COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 
AND RHETORICAL FEINTS 
On one level, an overly intrusive takings doctrine risks limiting 
important state flexibility to respond to evolving understandings of 
harm and public exigency. This might seem troubling if Stop the Beach 
Renourishment engenders litigation as advocates and courts try to 
give life to the plurality’s approach (and perhaps persuade Justice 
Kennedy). This early wave of litigation is especially likely given that 
the plurality did not explicitly limit the scope of judicial takings to 
cases where the state is the beneficiary of the decision, which means 
 
 52. See Saxer, supra note 16, at 91–102. For a discussion of common-law alternatives to 
achieve the substantive goals advocated by those who would expand Shelley’s approach to state 
action, see id. at 102–19. 
 53. See, e.g., Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners Ass’n, 929 A.2d 
1060 (2007) (involving restrictions on expressive conduct imposed by a homeowners' 
association). 
 54. See also supra note 35 (discussing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)). 
 55. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 139–41 (3d ed. 2008) (“[I]t is difficult to 
reconcile the subordination of property rights with the specific property guarantees in the 
Constitution.”). 
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that any change in property law that is thought to eliminate an 
established property right might be fair game.56 
On another level, however, Stop the Beach Renourishment may 
prove to be another instance in which the Court seems to draw a 
fundamental line in takings doctrine, the implications of which then 
turn out to be relatively minor. The best example of this kind of 
rhetorical feint is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.57 Although 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas advanced a seemingly 
uncompromising view of the Takings Clause, the opinion included an 
exception for restrictions that inhere in title.58 Justice Kennedy has 
subsequently suggested that legislative enactments, no less than 
judicial decisions, can create the background principles that form the 
basis for the Lucas exception.59 Lower courts, moreover, have been 
quite comfortable recognizing that the common law of property has 
give in its joints; thus, for compensation purposes, legislative acts are 
often judged by conceptions of harm that are not frozen in the realm 
of nineteenth-century nuisance law.60 
Likewise, the exchange between Justice Scalia and Justice 
Kennedy in Stop the Beach Renourishment about the nature of 
evolutionary norms in common-law property doctrine reveals a basic 
disagreement about when a change in law might transgress either the 
Takings Clause (for Justice Scalia) or the Due Process Clause (for 
Justice Kennedy). Justice Scalia, echoing his view about the 
narrowness of background principles of state law in Lucas, asserted 
that the Framers could not have contemplated judicial takings 
because “the Constitution was adopted in an era when courts had no 
power to ‘change’ the common law.”61 Furthermore, in Justice Scalia’s 
view, even when courts began to recognize an evolutionary common 
law, “it is not true that the new ‘common-law tradition . . . allow[ed] 
for incremental modifications to property law.’”62 Justice Kennedy, by 
contrast, highlighted that the state common law of property includes 
“incremental modification” that “owners may reasonably expect or 
 
 56. See supra text accompanying notes 43–45. 
 57. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 58. Id. at 1029. 
 59. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001). 
 60. See Richard J. Lazarus, Lucas Unspun, 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2007) 
(discussing Lucas’s reception). 
 61. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2606 
(2010). 
 62. Id. 
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anticipate courts to make.”63 Although Justice Kennedy is less than 
clear about how far this principle goes, the view of the evolutionary 
nature of private property and the expectations of most owners that 
he expressed in his Stop the Beach Renourishment concurrence seem 
likely to prevail if judicial takings are recognized. 
As with Lucas—the paradigm of what Laura Underkuffler has 
called the “Scalian” view of property64—the parade of horribles that 
might flow from accepting the substantive concern underlying judicial 
takings is unlikely to emerge. This is because, as Stop the Beach 
Renourishment itself demonstrates, Justice Scalia’s apparently broad 
view of what constitutes a clear contravention of existing law is not 
widely shared, and most courts are likely to find Justice Kennedy’s 
view of the flexibility of the common law more amenable. Thus, 
finding a true expropriating judicial decision—like a regulation that 
destroys all economic value without a countervailing background 
principle of state law—is likely to be exceedingly rare in practice. 65 
The Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality, in short, is likely to 
be a wonderful source of intellectual puzzles, but is built on a 
predicate sufficiently rare that it amounts to an almost abstract 
question. As a result, those who are concerned that a broader 
recognition of the role of the state in enforcing private property 
norms will limit needed flexibility in economic regulation more 
generally may have little to fear. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is too soon to know if the Stop the Beach Renourishment 
plurality will be remembered more as Pandora or Pirandello—the 
unleashing of a plague or simply a slightly absurd set piece (one 
characteristic in search of authority?). At the least, the decision has 
revived, even if momentarily, long-standing questions about the 
constitutional dimension of the judicial role in otherwise seemingly 
 
 63. Id. at 2613–18 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 64. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of 
Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 728 (2004) (describing this view as holding that 
“the idea of property is a concrete, objectively knowable, and immutable legal barrier which 
marks the boundary between protected individual interests and the permissible exercise of 
government power”). 
 65. In retrospect, the Justice who seemed to have understood Lucas best was Justice 
Souter; he would have dismissed the case as improvidently granted because the factual predicate 
was so implausible. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1076–79 (statement of Souter, 
J.). 
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private aspects of property. While that, too, may prove fleeting, it does 
provide an opportunity to reflect on aspects of the state role that are 
often left unnoted. 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, then, may have a silver lining for 
those concerned with the potential for private property to transgress 
public law norms. The case can provide a contemporary argument for 
understanding that judicial decisions setting the terms of private 
property may, in some circumstances, merit review for conformance 
with constitutional norms. Is it likely that the plurality’s approach will 
generate a flood of homeowner association due process cases or First 
Amendment suits against malls that limit speech? Most likely not, but 
the impulse to weigh private interests against constitutional values 
remains and Stop the Beach Renourishment provides a reminder of 
the importance of reflecting on that balance. 
 
